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Nor can Charny's work be assigned to other classical traditions of medical or psychological research. Although he is a psychoanalyst by training he does not base his work on psychodynamic inference, and even though his observational field is a psychotherapy session, his method could not properly be called clinical research. He focuses upon behavior, but not in the beliaviorist, neobehaviorist, or behavioral therapy traditions of psychological research. In fact, his method is not that of any experimental psychology, for he does not isolate variables. Rather, he describes units of individual behavior in a social context.

Charny studies social interaction, but not in order to define social structure per se. He uses the social relationship as a context to determine the meaning of individual behavior. It is obvious that he is relying upon some theory of the organism and some method of study that is basically different from the classical approaches of the psychological and clinical sciences. His work reflects a systems view of behavior and his methodology is a modern variant of the natural history approach that has evolved to synthesize elements and conceptualize systems as wholes.
In AHJ LHEBE IS nothing new in principle about a systems view. Rather, it is the newest form of a classical approach to the study of nature, one that evolved from ancient science to the naturalistic approach in Darwin's time, appeared as the holistic view in psychiatry, and was used with experimental verification by Einstein.
It is an oversimplification to reduce the complex history of science to this or that view. But I would, nevertheless, set in contrast two antithetical trends in order to build a crude perspective for the emergence of a systems view in the sciences of man.
Newton is often seen as the principal developer of the method in which some element of the whole is isolated for examination and measurement. 15 " 38 and (3) the formulation of research strategies for synthesizing elements and studying relations.
Material Systems
It is helpful to conceptualize living systems morphologically, that is, as material or concrete entities. This was one of the early steps in general systems theory.
14 -10 > -° It was seen that physically tangible systems are made up of tangible components: a group is made up of people, an organism of organs, an organ of cells, and so forth. Such material entities are seen as having specific relations and organization. Any given system is made up of particular components and these alone, which are arranged and organized only in particular, lawful, and standard ways. (A urea molecule consists always of given atoms in particular configuration; Congress consists of congressmen with specific roles and relationships.) Components of a system are themselves systems and are, in turn, made up of components that are systems. Hence, looking "upward" to complexity, a system is part of a larger system, and analyzing "downward" to elements, a system is made up of smaller systems. One relation between systems, then, is hierarchical: i.e., systems make up systems that make up still larger systems. For living systems, the hierarchy of levels is something as follows: Group Organism Organ system (e.g., endocrine) Organ (e.g., thyroid) Cell Molecule Etc.
A different order of relation exists between two interacting systems at the same level (e.g., thyroid and adrenal cortex) than between a system and the larger system to which it belongs (say, thyroid and endocrine). It is also apparent that the relationship between a system and its components is not a simple Aristotelian matter of class and member, for the components of a system are interactive and the properties of the larger system depend upon this interaction. Recognition of relationships of level is crucial in old problems like the relation of psyche and soma and in the operations of the new research methodology.
Behavioral Systems
Such a description, though serving as a useful model for seeing structural and morphological characteristics, is not sufficient for depicting the dynamics of living systems. For it is not the spatial relations of organs alone that maintains the living organism. A cell is certainly more
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than a bundle of molecules and a group is more than a number of bodies. Dynamically, a system is made up of the behavior or outputs of material systemsin interaction or relation to each other. Mrs. Smith, Mr. Smith, Betty, and Johnny are not what make up a family. A family is made up of relationships, reliable reciprocals like father-son, mother-daughter, husband-wife, and so on, all maintained in an integration. These relationships are, in turn, made up of behaviors. Mr. Smith is not fathering when he is driving his car to work or engineering a business deal. Fathering is the behavioral unit that he contributes to the family as a family member.
Suppose for a working definition we call any state of a system, including the change that brought it into that state, a behavior. We can postulate that the equilibrium of a system depends upon there being some limits to the range of the behavior of its component systems. The behavior of a system must be lawful and determined, in ordered relation to the behavior of the other components of the larger system. If there should be a runaway in thyroxin excretion or a sharp change in quality of the hormone or a triggering of the excretion that is not related to endocrine regulation, a disruption of endocrine system, then organism disequilibrium would result. Similarly, a group may not survive or remain organized if one or more members runs amok, invents new sets of responses or behaves bizarrely. So it is clear that a systems concept depends upon a deterministic view (not a linear determinism, but a concept of multiple simultaneous interactions-feedback), and we can insist that communication and social organization is not possible unless human behavior occurs in standard forms lawfully arranged in reference to subsystems (physiological) and suprasystems (social and ecological).
The demonstration that human be-havior meets these conditions came from structural linguistics. Language behavior occurs in standard units of articulation called phonemes (roughly equivalent to syllables), which are lawfully integrated into larger units called morphemes (roughly equivalent to words) that are, in turn, integrated into still larger units called syntactic sentences. 10 ' "• 21 - 22 In more recent years, it has been shown that many forms of human behavior occur in standard behavioral units integrated analogously. 16 ' "• 2S~26 These units are culturally determined, evolved in the traditions of a people, .and transmitted through some type of learning. The evidence for cultural determinism is that the morphology and arrangement of behavioral units is homogeneous among individuals within an ethnic, class, regional, and occupational categoiy, but heterogeneous between such groupings.
Organic and Organismic Levels
The characteristics of the human individual accrue from the transmission of qualities via two large systems: (1) from the gene pool, a molecularly coded template guides the division and specialization of cells that form tissues, organs, and organ systems level by level, and (2) from birth on, this organism is raised in a social group and is thus exposed to a culturally transmitted coding for the patternment of changes and states that we call behavior.
Methodologically, then, we can examine the organism from two general directions. The choice of an option between two operational possibilities seems to explain a long-standing confusion in the sciences of man. Theoretically, any investigator beginning with the cell and synthesizing upward level by level should arrive at the same picture of the individual as one who begins with the group and analyzes downward to the individual. But historically this has not been the case. One investigator arrives at a concept of man entirely different from that of another. It is as though two men had approached each other from two sides of a checkerboard and had not met because one had moved on the black and the other on the white squares. The biologically oriented scientists (including the medical researcher, the organic psychiatrist, and often the psychologist) have ended up with the idea of an organism that largely ignored learning and behavior. On the other hand, the social scientist and the psychologist (who was wittingly or unwittingly socially oriented) arrived at a concept of the person or individual described only in terms of behavior-i.e., learning, psychic processes, roles, etc.
The biological thinker, arriving at the organism by way of material subsystems, stopped short in his synthesis without knowing it, and saw the organism as a collection of organ systems. Wedded to the Newtonian tradition in which the components and not their organization was central, the biological investigator was a level below where he thought he was, which is always the case with a reductive investigation. On the other hand, the social scientist moved downward from group to relationships to behavior, observing through time the outward changes and actions of the organism, but often failed to give serious attention to the structural and morphological subsystems in the hierarchy.
Psychosomatic research has been caught right in the middle, using both traditions without the difference having been clearly conceptualized. Soma, a construct that in theory can be considered organismic (and thus take into account culturally prescribed and learned behavior), is in research operations invariably defined organically, i.e., by measurement of some subsystem output like blood pressure, corticosteroid level, etc. Soma is not, therefore, operationally at the same level as psyche. As will be seen, psyche must be an organismic construct. The old arguments, then, about psyche and soma, either as interacting or as different aspects of the same thing, wash out when conceived in terms of the basic relations of systems in a hierarchy.
The concept of levels helps us to grasp how our predecessors got into their conceptual dilemma and gives us an opportunity to correct it. We have not in the past separated the behavior of the relevant systems level by level. We have so often used the old familiar operational definition and said behavior is what an animal does. This would include any activity from metabolizing to breathing, playing bridge, or mating. Now we can specify the level or range of levels of behavior that we are investigating.
Soma and Organism
Behaviors of organ systems become integrated into a higher level of organization in the maturational process. At least in part, acculturation, socialization, and idiosyncratic experience create patterns of behavior which accompany somatic activities. Thus, one reference for these patterns is at the social level of organization: they are communicational, relational, and social insofar as their meaning, function, and formal determinants are concerned.
Consider some simple examples. The vibrating column of air that passes through the lips, pharynx, larynx, and trachea can be manipulated to produce vocalizations. The maturing child learns -in compliance with a cultural tradition -to form these sounds in definite quanta or units, phonemes, that are the basic building blocks of his language. At the same time he uses flush reactions, head and neck musculature, and other organ system activities to integrate these sounds in the enactment of the spoken statement. Another example is the formation of behavioral patterns in the process of ingestion. Such patterns involve not only the digestive system, but the articulatory system, posture, dress, cosmetics, and what not. Thus, eating may be genetic but, for the most part, when we eat, what we eat, and how we eat and act when we are eating are cultural and require that we see them also at a higher level of systems and behavioral integration.
Psyche and Organism
The difficulties we have had in the past in defining behavior and soma have been nothing compared to that in defining abstract constructs like psyche, mind, ego, and self. The matter is not straightened out by a systems model, but a few comments are in order. In common usage, 3 different kinds of definition have been customary for the term psyche:
1. Behavioral Psyche as the totality of behavior-e.g., in concepts like personality (By implication, a subject's psyche would have to be described by another person.) 2. Mentalistic Psyche as a subject's conception of himself (described, of necessity, by the subject himself) 3. Inferential Psyche as an abstraction about mentalistic or neuroprocesses reached by inferences from behavior (using what we now call a "black-box" model)
Separating organic and organismic levels immediately allows a partial clarification of these various usages. Any black-box inference about neuroprocesses belongs at a lower level; it is not a statement about the organism as a whole. It is probable that affect belongs also to the organic levels, as an experience of organic system states (though recognition and conceptualization of affect are organismic behaviors).
There seems to be little value in retaining terms like psyche to represent directly observable behavior. The observable activity of the organism we can call behavior, and reserve the term psyche for a subject's impression of his own and of other behavior (i.e., "reality"). We can conclude immediately that most, if not all, of a subject's knowledge of himself and the world has been learned. Often, to be sure, it has been learned as "insight" from his own observations, but more often it is learned in his family and his culture.
The fact is that members of a cultural tradition learn not only what behavior to perform in a given situation, but what to •say about it. What one learns to say becomes what one learns to think. It is, therefore, no longer tenable to base psychodynamic models on linear causation and say that thought causes behavior. For obviously the two are interconnected in multiple simultaneous causation, together with other aspects of organism state and social situation.
In any event, there seem to be two basic modes by which a subject can inform others (and himself) about his behavior: (1) linguistic and kinesic communication and (2) symbolic expression. Both are behavioral systems. So we are forced to classify the phenomenon of consciousness as a special subclass of organismic behavior.
The concept of the unconscious does not seem to change this self-interpretation. 27 ' 28 Some behaviors are observable and others are not. Operationally, the unconscious can be used to refer to the discrepancy between behavior (of self and all other systems) that is observable and reportable by the subject, and that which is not. (This discrepancy has to be extended to cover the difference between what significance a behavior is thought to have and what it can be observed to have.)
One can readily appreciate the disappointment of those researchers who have tried to make simple one-to-one correlations between psychic and somatic variables. The problem is that they have been studying them, whatever their theory, from different levels of organization.
Research Methodology
Assuming such an arrangement of matter in living systems as I have described and the occurrence of orderly changes at each level, an investigation in systems terms demands that we keep to a level and that we not confuse levels or jump unsystematically from one to the other.
The arrangement in a hierarchy is such that any behavior is mediated at the levels below and, in turn, sustains the order at higher levels. It is at these higher levels that the meaning or function of a behavior is assessed. This has led men like Simpson 29 to formulate rules something as follows: to describe a system we see it as a whole; to find out how it works we examine its component systems and their relations; to find out lohy, we examine its role in a larger system.
In the study of the human organism, we can describe what it is in terms of its behavior. The data about the organism are behavioral data, and these must be the focal point of organismic research. Then we can move to studying: (1) what people think and feel about behavior; (2) what the behavior means in a social and cultural context; and (3) what organic, cellular, and molecular systems maintain and mediate the behavior. It seems likely that states of human relationship are related to states of the organism that are related to states of all organismic subsystems. Changes at any level reverberate up and down the hierarchy until they are brought into equilibrium, so study at any level is vital. But behavior is the starting point and any change described must be related to the behavioral units that accompany it. The human being may eat when his blood sugar drops and when someone cooks dinner. When the focus of interest is in the individual, the behavior of eating should be studied at both levels.
An ultimate research program would include a team of specialists from the biological sciences and the behavioral and social sciences, men flexible enough to shift their frame of reference to those levels above or below their particular specialty. Short of such an ideal situation, Charny nevertheless embarks upon a relatively wide course of study. He begins by defining constellations of behavior. He has reason to believe that postural shifts will demarcate these units, 20 -M) so he sketches the postural aspects and fills in some of the lexical behaviors. Then he relates these units to the therapist-patient relationship as a social context.
There is an important tactical gain in shifting from inference and subjectivistic data to direct observation of behavior in a social context. Certainly, the individual learns something of the function, significance, and value of his behavior in growing up and, theoretically, we can gather some information by asking him (directly or by projective and other inferential techniques). But we know how often he misconceives what he does and why he does it. We can circumvent this problem and gain direct and objective data on the meaning and value of behavior by observing systematically what happens in an actual interaction when given behavior does and does not occur. Thus in a sense we duplicate Bernard's 31 classical method at the social level and take the matter out of the realm of our notions or the subject's notions about behavior. I am not suggesting that we return to Watson's negativity 32 about subjective experience, but
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that we treat it in psychosomatic research as additional data. It seems short-sighted to use it alone to assess organismic states. Another gain is made by shifting from the variable-often an a priori abstraction about behavior-to the behavioral unit. For the latter is presumed to be coded in the culture and to appear regularly in interaction, so that any investigator can repeat the observations. An even more radical implication for research method in a systems view, one that pervades all of its operations, is based on the cardinal principle that the system is an organization. We are not, therefore, able to study a system cogently by means of the Newtonian methods, useful as they are to study sets of mechanical components that are not in significant interaction. The components of a system are specialized and a study of one does not tell us about the others. And qualities emerge by virtue of organization that are not in the components alone-e.g., H 2 O is a liquid, a quality not predictable from the study of gaseous hydrogen and oxygen. Similarly, the study of the endocrine and cardiovascular systems will not tell us how an organism will behave as a whole; the study of personality will not predict how members will act in a group.
To study a system, we may break it down into parts as a step in the investigation, but we will have to then synthesize to examine organization. There are no independent variables in a system.
Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute Henry Ave. and Abbottsforcl Rd. Philadelphia, Pa. 19129 
